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1On production costs
in vertical differentiation models
Dorothée Brécard*
Université de Nantes, LEMNA
Abstract
In this paper, we analyse the effects of the introduction of a unit production cost beside
a fixed cost of quality improvement in a duopoly model of vertical product differentiation.
Thanks to an original methodology, we show that a low unit cost tends to reduce product
differentiation and thus prices, whereas a high unit cost leads to widen product
differentiation and to increase prices.
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21. Introduction
This paper originates from a naïve question: why vertical differentiation models
generally assume either a variable cost or a fixed one but, as far as we know, never both?
Indeed, models in the line with Mussa and Rosen (1978), Gal-Or (1983), Champsaur and
Rochet (1989) and Cremer and Thisse (1994) suppose the development of new quality
generates variable costs, whereas those in the line with Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1983)
assume that research and development of a new product induces fixed cost. All the same,
the improvement of product quality may involve fixed and variable costs. For instance, the
development of an automobile model by a car manufacturer or the rise in computer
capability, according to the Moore’s law, require not only research and development
(R&D) fixed costs but also production variable costs.
Obviously, the introduction of a fixed production cost in a model with variable quality
cost would not change firms’ quality choice. However, would the introduction of a
production unit cost in models with fixed quality cost modify firms’ quality choice and
therefore price choice? Motta (1993) argues that the constant unit production cost can be
neglected. In fact, this assumption enables him to strongly simplify the analytical
resolution of the game: This is the first answer to our naïve question. But is it really
without influences on the firms’ choices? Our paper shows that it is not really the case:
Thanks to an original analysis methodology, we also achieve to show that the unit
production cost plays a specific role in the game by creating an upgrading effect that raises
the prices of both products in the same proportion and allows several consumers to
substitute the high quality for the low one. As a result, a low unit cost tends to reduce
product differentiation and thus prices, whereas a high unit cost leads to widen product
differentiation and to increase prices.
2. The model
We consider a differentiated market in which consumers differ in their willingness-to-
pay for the best quality of the product. Each consumer buys one unit of the product or
none.1 There are only two identical firms in the industry. Each firm produces one variant of
the product and decides on its price.
There is a continuum of consumers whose marginal willingness-to-pay for quality,
denoted ! is uniformly distributed over "," [ ] with a unit density function. When the
consumer !  purchases the quality qi at price pi , he derives an indirect utility
u(") = "qi # pi . Thereby, the consumer ˜ " = pl ql  is indifferent between consuming the low
quality product ql  at price pl  or none of the products. The consumer ˆ " = ph # pl( ) qh # ql( )
is indifferent between consuming the low quality ql  at price pl  or the high quality qh  at
price ph  (with qh " ql " 0). As usual with such a model, we assume that the market is not
covered (" < ˜ " ), so that the demand for low quality product is dl = ˆ " # ˜ "  and the demand
for high quality product is dh = " # ˆ " .
                                                 
1 Alternatively, one can assume that a consumer derives utility only from the first unit he buys.
3In the duopoly, each firm i offers one quality qi and faces a R&D cost c qi( ) that enables
the provision of this quality. The quality cost is a standard quadratic function c qi( ) = f2 qi2
(with f " 0). Furthermore, firms incur the same unit cost v (v " 0).  Their profits are thus
given by:
" i = pi # v( )di # c qi( ) (1)
The competition between firms takes place in a two-stage game. In the first stage, they
decide on the quality qi to produce. In the second stage, firms choose prices pi .
3. The game Equilibrium
The game is solved by backward induction in order to provide the subgame perfect
equilibrium. In the second stage, firms choose their price taking as fixed qualities qh and
ql . The maximization of their profits (1) with respect to prices induces the following
equilibrium prices:
ph
*
=
2" qh qh # ql( ) + 3vqh
4qh # ql
pl
*
=
" ql qh # ql( ) + v 2qh + ql( )
4qh # ql
(2)
The corresponding demand functions are:
dh
*
=
2" qh # v
4qh # ql( ) dl
*
=
qh " ql # 2v( )
ql 4qh # ql( ) (3)
The unit cost v tends to increase prices and then to depress demand. The demand for the
lowest quality product remains thus positive as long as v is sufficiently low in comparison
with the willingness-to-pay of the consumer "  for the lowest quality ql :
v " # ql 2  (4)
In the first stage, firms choose quality specification qh
*  and ql
*  maximizing their profits,
according to the following first order conditions:2
"# h
"qh
=
2$ qh % v( ) 4qh % 7ql( )v + 8qh2 % 6qhql + 4ql2( )$ ( )
4qh % ql( )3
% fqh = 0
"# l
"ql
=
qh $ ql % 2v( ) 4qh % 7ql( )$ qhql + 8qh2 % 6qhql + 4ql2( )v( )
4qh % ql( )3ql2
% fql = 0
& 
' 
( 
( 
) 
( 
( 
(5)
In order to simplify these conditions, we operate a first variable substitution by denoting
" # qh
* ql
*  (with " #1). Both conditions (5) induce the following equality:
2"# ql
*
$ v( ) 2 4"2 $ 3" + 2( )# ql + 4" $ 7( )v[ ] =
"
2
# ql
*
$ 2v( ) 2 4"2 $ 3" + 2( )v + 4" $ 7( )"# ql*[ ]  (6)
When v = 0 , it induces, as in Motta (1993), 4"3 # 23"2 +12" # 8 = 0 . The only real
solution is " = 5.2512. By substituting this value into the first order conditions, we obtain
both equilibrium qualities qh
*
= 0.2533" 2 f  and ql* = 0.0482" 2 f .3
                                                 
2 The second order conditions are studied in appendix A1.
3 Motta (1993) proves that these qualities are indeed Nash equilibrium.
4When v > 0 , we cannot analytically express the equilibrium qualities. We can also turn
to numerical simulations (see section 4) or carry out an ex post analysis of the equilibrium.
To this aim, we operate a second variable substitution by expressing the unit cost v in term
of a percentage " of the ex post maximal willingness-to-pay for the equilibrium low quality
" ql
*  ( " # v $ ql
* , with " # 0, 12[ ] ). Since " is introduced into the analysis after the implicit
determination of qh
*  and ql
*  in (5), it corresponds to a variable substitution  and not to an
endogenisation of v. Thanks to this variable substitution, the following proposition holds.
Proposition 1. When the unit cost v is expressed in term of a percentage " of the ex post
maximal willingness-to-pay the low quality " ql
*  and " # 0, 12[ ] , the differentiation
parameter is the only one real root " #( ) of the polynomial function defined by
P ";#( ) = 4 1$ 4#2( )"4 + 12#2 + 8# $ 23( )"3 + 4 1+ #( ) 3$ 2#( )"2
+4 #2 + 2# $ 2( )" + 4# $ 7#2 (7)
Graph 1. Optimality conditions of the quality game
Graph 1a. #(") Graph 1b. $(")
For each value of ",P ";#( )  has one real root " #( ) greater than unity, which decreases
with " and reaches its minimum for " 0.07( ) = 5.1741, before increasing and then
exceeding its initial value for " =0.13 (cf. graph 1a).4 For each value of ", we thus compute
the only associated value " #( ) and then substitute " #( )ql*  for qh*  and "# ql* for v in the
second optimality condition (5). We therefore deduce the proposition 2 below.
Proposition 2. When the unit cost v is expressed in term of a percentage " of the ex post
maximal willingness-to-pay the low quality " ql
*  and " # 0, 12[ ] , the equilibrium low quality
ql
*  can be expressed as:
ql
*
=" #( ).$ 2 f (8)
with " #( ) =
1$ 2#( )% #( ) 4.% #( ) $ 7( )% #( ) + 2 4% #( )2 $ 3% #( ) +1( )#( )
4.% #( ) $1( )3 (9)
and the equilibrium high quality is defined by qh
*
= " #( )ql*.
                                                 
4 Calculations and simulations were made with the software Mathematica. We cannot express
straightforwardly the form of this root.
5The function " #( )  slightly increases up to " 0.06( ) = 0.049  before decreasing to zero
for " = 0.5 (cf. graph 1b). When " = 0, the game solution corresponds to the Motta’s
quality equilibrium without unit cost. The game equilibrium formulation set out in the
proposition 2 allows us to sharpen the effects of key parameters of the game on firms’
choices, particularly the production unit cost.
4. The effects of variable cost introduction
In order to analyse the effects of the existence of a production unit cost, we examine the
game equilibrium for different values of v and draw a parallel between these simulations
and the analytical expression of the equilibrium (see appendix A2 for a simulation
exemple). We restrict here the study to the duopoly case.
Graphs 2. Effects of a rise in unit cost (for " 2 = 1  and f = 1)
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According to the graph 2a, a unit cost lower than 0.003 tends to improve the low quality
until ql
*
= 0.049 whereas a higher unit cost reduces it. That is in the line with the shape of
" #( )  which reaches its maximum for " = 0.06, such as " 0.06( ) = 0.049 . Furthermore, the
unit cost tends to downgrade the high quality. This effect arises from its contradictory
impact on ql
*  and " #( ). The latter decreases for " # 0.07, for which ql*  grows (with
" 0.07( ) # " 0.06( ) , and increases when ql*  falls. Simulations show that the decreasing
effect outweighs the increasing one.
Moreover, the unit cost weighs on prices, through its direct effect on production cost
and its indirect impact on product differentiation, beyond the threshold 0.07 (graph 2b). A
higher unit cost also leads to a loss in demand addressed to each firm (graph 2c).
6Noticeably, profit of both firms decreases with the unit cost, in such a way as a high unit
cost implies a high quality monopoly (graph2d).
The effects of the production unit cost may also be resume in the proposition below.
Proposition 3. A low unit cost induces an improvement of the low quality (if " # 0.06), a
degradation of the high quality, a fall in product differentiation (if " # 0.07) and an
increase in prices. A high unit cost induces a degradation in the low quality (if " # 0.06)
and in the high quality, an increase in product differentiation (if " # 0.07) and an increase
in price. Beyond the unit cost threshold v = 0.18" ql
*  ( " # 0.18), the low quality product
firm is ousted.
Furthermore, equations (8) and (9) enable us to give some analysis elements for other
key parameters of the firms’ choice. In order to carry out this study, we present below an
illustration of the game equilibrium with a unit cost v = 0.1" ql
*. Following the equation (8),
the differentiation parameter is here " 0.1( ) = 5.2015 and the equilibrium is characterized
by:
qh
*
= 0.2528" 2 f ql* = 0.0486" 2 f
ph
*
= 0.0038 + 0.1072" ( )" 2 f pl* = 0.0028 + 0.0103" ( )" 2 f
dh
*
= 0.5252" # 0.0050 dl
*
= 0.2626" # 0.0525
(10)
According to (10), the fixed cost parameter f tends to decrease product differentiation
(qh
*
" ql
*
= 0.207# 2 f ) and prices, through deterioration of the quality of both products.
Demand for each variant is independent of f which doesn’t affect the quality-adjusted
prices pi
* qi
* . Obviously, the more the maximal marginal willingness-to-pay "  is high, the
more qualities, prices and profits are great.
5. Conclusion
The introduction of a positive unit production cost in a vertical differentiation model
with fixed cost for quality improvement is not neutral. Thanks to an original analysis
method of the game equilibrium, we highlight that a low unit cost tends to reduce product
differentiation and thus prices, whereas a high unit cost leads to raise product
differentiation and prices. Furthermore, a high unit cost may lead to a high quality
monopoly.
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Appendix 1. Second order conditions of the quality subgame
The first equation of conditions (5) is decreasing with qh:
"
2
# h
"qh
2 = $
8 % ql $ 2v( )
4qh $ ql( )2
v 2qh $ 5ql( ) + % ql 5qh + ql( )[ ] $ f < 0
because the first term is positive and the term in brackets is negative, and
"# h
"qh qh= 0
=
v 4$ ql % 7v( )
ql
2 > 0  when the condition (4) is met.
The second equation of (5) is increasing for low values of ql  and decreasing for larger
values of ql . The second derivative of firm l’s profit is:
"
2
# l
"ql
2 =
2qh 4 16qh
3
$16qh
2ql + 6qhql
2
$ 3ql
3( )v 2 $ % qh 8qh + 7ql( ) $ 4v 5qh + ql( )[ ]% ql3[ ]
4qh $ ql( )2ql3
$ f
A solution exists if there is x > 0  such as " 2# l x( ) "ql2 = 0  and "# l x( ) "ql > 0 . Some
numerical simulations show that a stable equilibrium exists (graph. A1) if the unit cost is
lower than a threshold ˆ v , which is all the more high as "  is high (for " =1 and f=1,
ˆ v =0.0108).
Graph A1. Simulation of 
"# l "ql  for qh = 0.25*
% For "=0  (clear grey curve), 0.005  (dark grey curve) and 0.01  (black curve)
8A2. Simulations results for " =1 and f =1.
Tab. A1 Direct simulations of first order conditions
v 0 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.008
ql
*
0.0482 0.0488 0.0488 0.0481 0.0463
qh
*
0.2533 0.2532 0.2529 0.2525 0.2521
pl
*
0.0102 0.0115 0.0126 0.0137 0.0145
ph
*
0.1077 0.1089 0.1104 0.1121 0.1141
d l 0.2625 0.2412 0.2196 0.1970 0.1714
dh 0.5250 0.5232 0.5223 0.5188 0.5157
" l 0.0015 0.0011 0.0009 0.0003 0
" h 0.0244 0.0239 0.0235 0.0231 0.0230
Tab. A2 Simulations of first order conditions with v " #$ ql
*
" 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.18
" #( ) 0.0482 0.0489 0.0486 0.0472 0.0459
" #( ) 5.2512 5.1765 5.2015 5.3397 5.4893
ql
*
0.0482 0.0489 0.0486 0.0472 0.0459
qh
*
0.2533 0.2531 0.2528 0.2523 0.2520
v 0 0.0024 0.0048 0.0071 0.0082
